Azerbaijan was able to exploit this gap with its large fleet of sophisticated drones. Drones of Russian, Turkish, Israeli, and indigenous designs performed both reconnaissance missions to support artillery use and strike missions. Azerbaijan has also used the high-definition cameras the TB2s carry to produce many propaganda videos. Only England and Wales jurisdiction apply in all legal matters. 
Some analysts have suggested the issue was the lack of Armenian combat-field-craft they were parked or drove in the open with insufficient use of camouflage or terrain concealment and often were too tightly bunched into a convenient target to be detected and attacked. Azerbaijani forces used a sophisticated method to destroy Russian-made S-300 air defence systems during the Nagorno-Karabakh war last year, combining Soviet-era single-engine planes withIsraeli-made "suicide"drones, Middle East Eye can reveal. Sometimes these are permanent and sometimes temporary. To quote a typical example: Azerbaijans UAVs obliterated Armenias formidable array of ground-based air defences, after which they systematically decimated Armenias ground force matriel, including tanks, artillery pieces, and supply trucks. Azerbaijan also developed an impressive drone arsenal composed of Turkish and Israeli UAVs. Photo: ARIS MESSINIS/AFP via Getty Images, Program Manager and Research Associate, Missile Defense Project, Associate Fellow, Missile Defense Project, Defense Industry, Acquisition, and Innovation, Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, Energy, Climate Change, and Environmental Impacts, Family Planning, Maternal and Child Health, and Immunizations, Building Sustainable and Inclusive Democracy, Responding to Egregious Human Rights Abuses, Commentaries, Critical Questions, and Newsletters, Future of drone wars back in focus after US strike killed Afghan civilians, Opening Doors: A Conversation with Shaan Shaikh and Seamus Daniels, Missiles for peace: A path to a durable cease-fire in Yemen. 
The Azeri air force did conduct approximately 600 sorties by manned-aircraft,[vii] mostly Su-25s and attack-helicopters, but there is only anecdotal information on their targets. The fact is that on the first days of the war repeated Azeri ground attacks failed to penetrate Armenian defences[x] and that even after they finally succeeded, exploiting this success faced stiff resistance and they suffered a few more tactical defeats before the final victory. Armenia inherited its Tochka and Scud missiles from the Soviet Union following its collapse and purchased Iskander missiles from Russia in 2016. While these technologies exist today, there are difficulties in developing them at an affordable rate to provide defense at multiple echelons, including the tactical level. The war was won by Azeri perseverance in the face of heavy casualties and many small defeats while gradually wearing-down Armenian forces no-less determined than the Azeris[xi] and gradually taking ground till the Armenian political and military leadership realized that the situation was irretrievably lost, and further resistance would cost more casualties and territory but achieve nothing. A careful study of Armenias air defence shows that it was not formidable, certainly not where drones are concerned. This misrepresents events in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Syria. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). It should be remembered that not all these targets were hit by drones. One potential explanation for this limited use is the small missile inventories possessed by Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan even didnt need to change the actual shape of the Antonovs, they just need to appear as military drones on the radar.. One weakness of the remotely piloted drone is the threat that the enemy might override the controls and force it to crash by jamming or spoofing the signals sent by its pilot. What is clear is that even if the Armenians did shoot down 264 drones, the Azeris apparently had many more available enough to achieve the results described above. These strikes further illustrate the vulnerability of advanced air defense systems, even if these numbers are exaggerated or the systems were not completely destroyed. It can be said that this was the first postmodern conflict, in that it was the first in which unmanned-aircraft overwhelmed a conventional ground force, grinding it down to the point of impotence and paving the way for the Azeri ground forces to roll in and take possession of a strategic chokepoint.[i]. Armenia purchased Iskander missiles from Russia, and Azerbaijan bought the LORA from Israel. [ii] The Azeris do not admit this but comparing their statements at different times reveals their inaccuracy. [xvii] "Russia Shot-Down A Total Of Nine Turkish Bayraktar Drones Near Its Armenian Military Base Russian Media Reports", EurAsian Times, October 21, 2020, https://eurasiantimes.com/russia-shot-down-a-total-of-nine-turkish-bayraktar-drones-near-its-armenia-military-base-russian-media-reports/ However, it should be remembered that manned aircraft have been operating like this for many years, even when the enemy ostensibly has some air defence capability see the Israeli air forces almost complete freedom of action since 1982. Armenias rocket artillery is also mostly Russian, apart from its Chinese WM-80 multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS). However, after suffering many fewer casualties than claimed in press releases by the Turks, the Syrian recovered within 24 to 48 hours, halted the Rebel ground attack the Turkish drone-offensive was supporting and counter-attacked to retake all ground lost to the Rebels and more. Given the overall size of Nagorno-Karabakh and its mountainous terrain, 6 Tors were a drop in the bucket compared to the number needed to create a robust defence with overlapping fields-of-fire to provide cover for each other. The use of UAVs and missiles to suppress and destroy air defenses gives greater validation to an observation of the U.S. Armys Air and Missile Defense 2028strategy: The most stressing threat is a complex, integrated attack incorporating multiple threat capabilities in a well-coordinated and synchronized attack.. These drones were made of the best technology and they were considered indestructible.[xvi] The only change made by the Azeris from the July skirmish to the war, was to add a new drone to their arsenal the missile-firing Bayraktar TB2 drone, enabling them to strike targets up to 8 kilometers away. In at least one event, Armenia reportedly used Tochka and Scud missiles in attacks on Ganja, the second-most populous city in Azerbaijan. Drones in the Nagorno-Karabakh War: Analyzing the Data.
Systems optimized to confront manned-aircraft are usually not sufficient to confront the smaller drones though against larger drones they can be effective.[xix]. Furthermore, 563 certain destructions by drones average to only 13 per day of the 44 day war. However, this gap was created by Armenian mistakes, not by the essential nature of drone warfare. [viii] Here too propaganda issues muddy the waters the Azeris deny, though multiple other sources attest to, the involvement of Syrian mercenaries, who apparently suffered 250 to 540 killed depending on the source. On the Armenian side, nine days after the war ended, Armenian General Movses Hakobyan, Chief Military Inspector of the Armed Forces, resigned and claimed that all the official statements by the Armenian Ministry of Defence had been lies. So basing computations of the future capability of drones against air defences on the Nagorno-Karabakh war is misleading. Dr. Eado Hecht is a defense analyst focusing on the connection between military theories and doctrines and their implementation. They enabled Azerbaijani forces to find, fix, track, and kill targets with precise strikes far beyond the front lines.
In addition to providing identification and targeting data, the TB2s also carried smart, micro guided munitions to kill targets on their own. The fighting, which began in late September, concluded on November 10 through a Moscow-brokered truce that resulted in the deployment of some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers and significant Armenian territorial concessions. It comes not from the tactical capabilities of the drones, but from their cheapness, simplicity and availability compared to manned aircraft. First a qualification an issue not discussed here is the tactical effect of drone-swarms as opposed to single drones, since none were employed. We see this timeandtime again with both sides operating out in the open, static or moving slowly; poorly camouflaged; and clumped in tight, massed formations.
It seems that these small arsenals forced each side to use ballistic missiles sparingly to preserve inventory if the conflict lasted longer. The video and imagery available online suggest that neither Armenian nor Azerbaijani forces had adequate resources or training on passive defense. Image from Radio Free Europe at https://bit.ly/3FdxQt4 - Still released by Azerbaijan's Defense Ministry, October 1, UAV. The Azeris apparently conducted a number of photo-op raids in which combat teams with cameras infiltrated behind Armenian forces to film the liberation of locations but withdrew shortly after. As with Armenia, however, the BM-30 Smerch appeared to be Azerbaijans rocket of choice. This will probably change in the future, but is correct for several years at least. Azerbaijans use of the LORA illustrates some of the limits of ballistic missiles as a tool for military operations. After the war, President Aliyev published a summary of Armenian equipment destroyed and captured by the Azeris. To paraphrase British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin argument in 1932, The drone will always get through?
Table 2: Azerbaijans Missiles, Drones, and Rocket Artillery, Sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan. The current author has considered and corrected a couple of small errors. However, the strike videos they released showed much fewer air defence targets struck than declared so either the declarations were exaggerated, or the videos were only a chosen sample. Also, as the war progressed, journalists visiting 'liberated' villages often found them still in Armenian hands.
[ii] Numbers published daily contradicted numbers published previously and later. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Perhaps the proven destructions by drones are fewer than the total destroyed by drones, and perhaps the number of photographically proven drone-destructions is virtually all there were. They are generally recognized as less capable than Azerbaijans fleet of foreign UAVs. The only way to win, suggested Baldwin, was to bomb the rival even more powerfully than he could bomb Britain so that the rival would capitulate before Britain was forced to. Despite early Armenian threats to use its more advanced Iskander missiles, the attacks on Ganja used older Soviet weapons. The Azeris observed it with a drone from a safe distance till it folded its antenna and drove into a garage for maintenance or rest. And then Israeli-built Harop loitering munitions, dubbed'kamikaze drones', would hit the Russian-made systems.. By wars end, the Armenians claimed to have shot down a grand total of 264 drones, 25 combat aircraft and 16 helicopters,[xii] however, provided no evidence. [xi] There have been reports of Armenian troops and units deserting against fewer reports claiming the same on Azeri troops. [v] President Aliyev's Speech to the Nation, 1st December 2020, https://mod.gov.az/en/news/president-of-azerbaijan-ilham-aliyev-addressed-the-nation-video-33929.html. Shaan Shaikh is a research associate with the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Wes Rumbaugh is an associate fellow with the CSIS Missile Defense Project. As soon as it was unable to defend itself, it was bombarded with a number of suicide drones. Syrian regime forces were initially surprised and shocked as they had no air defence assets facing a Rebel force devoid of aircraft. Armenian ballistic missile strikes in Ganja, which is outside of Nagorno-Karabakh, would seem to be an outlier in this regard, though. The technical storage or access is required to create user profiles to send advertising, or to track the user on a website or across several websites for similar marketing purposes.
